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Abstract	
Cohen	and	Machalek’s	(1988)	evolutionary	ecological	theory	of	crime	explains	why	obscure	
forms	of	predation	can	be	the	most	lucrative.	Sutherland	explained	that	it	is	better	to	rob	a	
bank	at	the	point	of	a	pen	than	of	a	gun.	The	US	Savings	and	Loans	scandal	of	the	1980s	
suggested	 ‘the	best	way	to	rob	a	bank	 is	 to	own	one’.	Lure	constituted	by	 the	anomie	of	
warfare	and	transition	to	capitalism	in	former	Yugoslavia	revealed	that	the	best	way	to	rob	
a	bank	 is	 to	control	 the	regulatory	system:	that	 is,	 to	control	a	central	bank.	This	makes	
possible	theft	of	all	the	people’s	money	in	a	society.	The	criminological	imagination	must	
attune	to	anomie	created	by	capitalism,	and	to	the	evolutionary	ecology	of	lure.	
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Introduction:	From	Sutherland	to	an	ecology	of	lure	
In	conceiving	of	white‐collar	crime,	Sutherland	(1983)	argued	that	the	best	way	to	rob	a	bank	was	
not	at	 the	point	of	a	gun,	but	at	the	point	of	a	pen.	Then	white‐collar	crime	scholars	in	the	US	
during	the	1980s	Savings	and	Loans	scandals	globalized	an	evocative	refinement	of	this	insight	
with	‘[t]he	best	way	to	rob	a	bank	is	to	own	one’.	This	became	a	theme	of	many	journal	articles	
and	the	title	of	Black’s	(2005)	fine	book.	These	were	storylines	that	helped	develop	criminological	
theory,	continuing	the	Sutherland	tradition	of	contending	that	criminological	theory	that	neglects	
high	crimes	of	capitalism	is	a	worryingly	truncated	form	of	theory.		
	
This	 article	 argues	 that,	 while	 the	 US	 is	 the	 heartland	 of	 the	 most	 influential	 forms	 of	 both	
criminology	and	capitalism,	criminological	theory	has	not	been	as	enriched	as	it	might	have	by	
white‐collar	crime	scholarship	because	it	has	been	overly	focused	on	the	US,	with	some	nodding	
recognition	 to	Western	European	 ‘varieties	of	 capitalism’	 (Hall	and	Soskice	2001).	The	article	
maintains	that	Sutherland	was	wrong	to	say	that	the	best	way	to	rob	a	bank	is	at	the	point	of	a	
pen;	and	that	it	is	also	false	that	‘the	best	way	to	rob	a	bank	is	to	own	one’.		
	
The	best	way	to	rob	a	bank	works	like	this.	After	taking	over	a	state,	a	political	party	announces	
an	 impending	 change	 to	 the	 currency.	 Citizens	 and	businesses	 are	 urged	 to	hand	 in	 their	 old	
currency	for	credits	in	their	bank	accounts	in	the	new	money.	The	banks	gather	up	all	the	old	
currency	for	destruction.	Instead	of	destroying	it,	the	political	leadership	sends	truckloads	of	old	
currency	to	other	countries	that	are	still	trading	it—to	exchange	it	for	hard	currency.	This	allows	
all	the	cash	from	all	the	wallets	and	purses	of	all	citizens,	from	every	business	in	the	country,	from	
the	vaults	of	all	its	banks,	to	go	into	the	pockets	of	ruling	party	leaders	and	cronies.	This	is	not	an	
imaginary	crime	strategy.	It	was	executed	by	the	leaders	of	Slovenia,	then	Croatia,	in	1991	at	the	
outset	of	the	Yugoslav	Wars	through	the	conversion	of	Yugoslav	dinars	(that	were	supposedly	all	
destroyed).	As	an	innovative	strategy	of	predation	through	the	banking	system,	this	created	the	
initial	fortunes	of	some	of	the	wealthiest	businessmen	in	post‐war	Yugoslavia.	
	
A	theoretical	insight	that	follows	from	seeing	this	innovation	in	bank	crime	is	the	need	to	connect	
anomie	theory	to	the	ecological	theory	of	crime.	Durkheim	(1952	[1897])	helps	us	to	see	that	
crime	is	fostered	by	conditions	of	collapse	of	normative	order:	anomie.	When	it	is	no	longer	clear	
what	the	rules	of	the	game	are,	nor	even	who	should	enforce	those	rules,	new	levels	of	criminal	
innovation	become	possible	that	were	impossible	before	the	onset	of	anomie.	War	enables	that	
perfect	storm	of	anomie,	as	we	see	in	the	former	Yugoslavia	of	the	1990s.	One	senior	journalist	
who	had	researched	the	Yugoslav	dinar	scandal	(strategy	12	below)	said	Yugoslavia	at	that	time	
was	an	‘El	Dorado	of	anarchy’	(Interview	081601).	War	also	results	in	the	blockage	of	legitimate	
opportunities	to	get	rich	and	the	opening	up	of	illegitimate	opportunities.	This	was	the	insightful	
development	of	anomie	theory	in	the	writing	of	Merton	(1949)	and	Cloward	and	Ohlin	(1961).	It	
was	also	an	insight	of	the	American	bank	robber	Willie	Sutton	who,	when	asked	by	a	journalist	
why	he	robbed	banks,	reputedly	replied	‘because	that’s	where	the	money	is’.		
	
Through	 enabling	 innovative	 new	 forms	 of	 banking	 crime	 that	 are	 impossible	 in	 less	 anomic	
societies,	war	extends	ecosystems	of	predation.	An	insight	of	the	evolutionary	ecological	theory	
of	crime	(Cohen	and	Machalek	1988;	Vila	1994)	is	that,	as	in	nature,	minority	forms	of	predation	
flourish.	This	helps	us	see	why	criminology	is	so	inept	at	knowing	or	understanding	the	size	of	
the	white‐collar	crime	problem.	 If	criminologists	know	about	a	 strategy	of	banking	predation,	
other	 banking	 criminals	will	 be	 planning	 to	 exploit	 it,	meaning	 it	 is	 at	 risk	 of	 extinction	 as	 a	
strategy	of	predation.	The	best	strategies	of	predation	are	maximally	effective	because	secrecy	
prevents	other	predators	from	knowing	about	it	and	crowding	out	its	effectiveness.		
	
The	first	insight	of	Cohen	and	Machalek’s	(1988)	analysis	is	that	the	returns	to	an	expropriative	
strategy	vary	 inversely	with	 the	number	 of	 others	who	 are	 engaging	 in	 the	 same	 strategy.	 In	
nature,	a	behavioural	strategy	of	predation	is	more	likely	to	persist	if	it	is	different	from	that	used	
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by	other	predators.	There	is	no	‘best’	strategy	that	will	be	adopted	by	every	predator	because	it	
is	the	best;	for	a	predator	to	survive,	it	must	have	a	strategy	that	is	not	crowded	out	by	others	
using	 a	 similar	 strategy.	 Extreme	 wealth	 and	 access	 to	 levers	 of	 state	 power	 fosters	
extraordinarily	lucrative	minority	strategies.	Where	there	is	no	limit	on	what	can	be	spent	on	an	
expropriative	strategy,	it	can	be	designed	to	beat	all	alternative	less	adequately	funded	strategies.	
This	 is	 why	 the	 most	 damaging	 and	 most	 lucrative	 expropriative	 strategies	 are	 white‐collar	
crimes.	Anyone	can	stage	a	bank	robbery	(strategy	1	in	this	article),	but	most	people	do	not	have	
the	‘resource	holding	potential’	(Cohen	and	Machalek	1988)	to	execute	bank	robbery	(strategies	
2‐12	discussed	below).		
	
Some	 previous	 criminological	 studies	 already	 confirmed	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 evolutionary	
ecological	 theory	 to	 white‐collar	 crimes	 (Benson	 2011;	 Braithwaite	 1991:	 46).	 A	 peculiar	
advantage	 that	 powerful	 white‐collar	 criminals	 have	 is	 in	 the	 domain	 that	 the	 evolutionary	
ecologists	 call	 counter‐strategy	 dynamics.	 Fast	 predators	 activate	 a	 selective	 force	 favouring	
faster	prey	and	vice	versa	(Cohen	and	Machalek	1988).	Box	(1983:	59)	argued	that	the	greatest	
comparative	advantage	of	corporate	criminals	‘lies	in	their	ability	to	prevent	their	actions	from	
becoming	subject	to	criminal	sanctions	in	the	first	place’.	The	same	might	be	said	of	war	criminals.	
The	lure	of	impunity	can	be	grasped	by	the	powerful	but	not	the	powerless.	
	
What	are	the	implications	of	seeing	limits	of	the	brilliantly	simple	insight	in	Black’s	(2005)	The	
Best	Way	to	Rob	a	Bank	is	to	Own	One?	One	is	that	our	replacement	insight—that	the	best	way	to	
rob	 a	bank	 is	 to	 gather	up	 all	 the	 cash	 in	a	 country	 and	 then	exchange	 it	 for	US	dollars	 after	
announcing	a	change	of	the	currency—will	not	survive	long	as	the	best	strategy.	Another	is	that	
successive	waves	of	innovation	in	banking	crime	can	mean	that,	as	more	criminals	move	along	
that	 sequence	 of	 sophisticated	 strategies,	 earlier	 strategies	 along	 the	 sequence	 can,	 with	 the	
passing	of	history,	become	neglected.	In	countries	where	robbing	banks	at	the	point	of	a	gun	has	
almost	disappeared,	disinvestment	in	target	hardening	against	this	form	of	crime	can	rationally	
reach	a	level	where	clever	innovators	move	back	into	an	old	niche	when	they	see	target‐softening	
of	the	old	security	architecture	that	protected	against	robbery	at	the	point	of	a	gun.		
	
In	other	words,	the	ecology	of	bank	crime	perpetually	creates	new	forms	and	heights	of	predation,	
yet	leaves	behind	a	growing	range	of	lesser	predatory	options	that	continue	to	have	long‐term	
niches.	We	see	this	most	clearly	with	forms	of	white‐collar	crime	like	Ponzi	schemes	that	it	was	
thought	had	had	their	day	in	the	West	because	investors	were	alert	to	them.	Maybe	Ponzi	and	
pyramid	schemes	continued	to	have	a	large	impact	in	Albania	(Jarvis	2000)	or	Papua	New	Guinea	
(Regan	2010),	but	surely	not	in	New	York.	Precisely	because	defenses	drop	when	this	belief	takes	
hold,	along	can	come	Bernie	Madoff	with	the	boldest	and	biggest	Ponzi	crime	(uncovered	in	2008)	
New	York	had	ever	seen	(Van	de	Bunt	2010).		
	
At	 this	point	 in	history,	 this	article	argues	 that	we	can	see	 the	 following	hierarchy	of	banking	
predations.	 It	 is	not	 exhaustive	even	of	known	strategies	but	highlights	key	 transitions	 in	 the	
historical	 evolution	 of	 banking.	 We	 argue	 for	 12	 strategies	 in	 the	 historical	 hierarchy	 of	
innovation:	the	early	entries	are	historically	older;	 later	ones	are	progressively	more	lucrative	
today.	
	
1. Rob	a	bank	at	the	point	of	a	gun	(Bonnie	and	Clyde).	
2. Rob	 a	 bank	 at	 the	 point	 of	 a	 pen	 (Sutherland’s	 insight;	 Frank	 Abagnale’s	 check	
forgeries).	
3. Build	 a	 Ponzi	 banking	 structure	 where	 all	 depositors	 pass	 on	 a	 higher	 liability	 to	
another	until	collapse	when	new	depositors	cannot	be	found	(Charles	Ponzi).	
4. Use	your	power	over	the	CEO	of	a	bank	to	order	payment	of	a	large	loan	to	your	relative	
or	crony	at	a	ridiculously	low	interest	rate	(Republika	Srpska’s	President	Dodik).	
5. Own	a	bank,	then	loot	deposits	(Charles	Keating;	Savings	and	Loans).	
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6. Rob	 a	 bank	 at	 the	 point	 of	 a	 keystroke	 (Soviet	 scam	over	 the	Bank	 of	 Spain’s	 gold	
bullion;	robbing	a	bank	in	cyberspace).	
7. Pull	out	the	money	from	the	central	bank	by	abusing	your	political	power	(Democratic	
Republic	 of	 the	 Congo’s	 Mobutu;	 Yugoslavia’s	 Slobodan	 Milosevic;	 Iraq’s	 Saddam	
Hussein).	
8. Mortgage	the	future	wealth	of	a	country	you	control	to	foreign	powers;	send	offshore	
the	proceeds	from	the	loans	for	mortgaging	that	future	(Democratic	Republic	of	the	
Congo’s	Kabila).	
9. Create	a	bank	that	serves	the	dirty	money	needs	of	the	intelligence	services	of	major	
powers;	use	the	superpower	protection	to	become	the	bank	of	choice	for	the	world’s	
leading	corporate	and	organized	criminals;	then	loot	that	bank	(Nugan	Hand;	Bank	of	
Credit	and	Commerce	International	(BCCI)).		
10. Structure	derivatives	to	conceal	the	true	state	of	the	national	debt	of	an	entire	country;	
use	 this	 opportunity	 to	 corruptly	 skim	 off	 wealth	 as	 you	 drive	 the	 country	 to	
bankruptcy	(Goldman	Sachs’	scam	for	Greece’s	leaders).		
11. Manipulate	 derivatives:	 for	 example,	 slice	 and	 dice	 bad	 loans	 of	 banks	 in	 a	
sophisticated	economy;	misrepresent	and	sell	the	securitized	bad	loans	to	banks	in	less	
sophisticated	economies	and	other	naive	investors	(longstanding	scams	that	became	
visible	after	the	2007‐2008	Global	Financial	Crisis).	
12. Change	 the	 currency;	 keep	 the	 new	 and	 sell	 all	 the	 old	 cash	 (Croatian	 Democratic	
Union’s	political	leadership).		
	
Not	 only	 is	 this	 list	 incomplete	 because	 of	 the	 unknowability	 of	 the	 current	 cutting	 edge	 of	
predation	 but	 the	 ordering	 of	 entries	 is	 also	 controversial.	 Most	 notably,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	
argument	that	strategies	11	and	12	should	be	in	reverse	order.	The	banking	crimes	exposed	by	
the	Global	Financial	Crisis	certainly	involved	a	far,	far	higher	value	in	US	dollars	than	the	Croatian	
Democratic	 Union’s	 currency	 swap.	 But,	 as	 a	 proportion	 of	 citizens’	 wealth	 of	 defrauded	
economies	 such	 as	 the	 little	 economies	 of	 Bosnia,	 Macedonia	 and	 Montenegro,	 and	 as	 a	
proportion	 of	 Croatia’s	 GDP,	 strategy	 12	 looms	 larger	 than	 the	 proportion	 of	 the	 US	 GDP	
implicated	in	the	crimes	of	the	Global	Financial	Crisis.	It	also	involved	a	bolder	innovation	of	the	
criminal	 imagination	 unknown	 to	 the	Western	 criminological	 academy.	 It	 was	 covered	 up	 in	
Croatia	and	Slovenia	and	only	vaguely	understood	by	most	elite	insiders	we	interviewed.		
	
Getting	this	hierarchy	just	right	is	ultimately	impossible	because	of	unknowability	in	complexity	
theory	terms.	Getting	it	right	is,	however,	unimportant	because	it	is	already	radically	in	flux	and	
will	likely	change	in	the	course	of	this	article	going	to	press.	What	is	theoretically	important	is	to	
see	how	anomie	theory	converges	with	the	evolutionary	ecological	theory	of	crime	to	constantly	
expand	this	list,	momentarily	making	the	latest	entries	on	the	list	stupendous	crimes,	yet	without	
completely	eliminating	the	future	relevance	of	every	older	entry	on	the	list.	The	implication	of	
our	analysis	is	that	Bonnie	and	Clyde	criminology,	the	staple	of	criminology	journals,	is	not	good	
enough.	It	fails	to	see	the	anomic	and	ecological	texture	of	crime	in	contemporary	capitalism.	In	
fairness,	 most	 good	 criminology	 journals	 today	 are	 more	 sophisticated	 than	 our	 simple	
characterization.	They	all	at	least	add	a	thin	layer	of	bread	and	butter	cybercrime	to	their	diet	of	
Bonnie	and	Clyde	criminology.		
	
Method	
This	research	relied	for	expanding	our	criminological	imagination	of	bank	crime	complexity	on	
280	fieldwork	interviews	across	the	former	Yugoslavia	conducted	jointly	by	the	authors	on	four	
fieldwork	trips	mostly	between	2013	and	2017.	Nine	 former	Presidents	or	Prime	Ministers	of	
Yugoslavia	or	 its	 successor	 states	or	 substates	 (including	Republika	Srpska	as	a	sub‐state,	 for	
example)	were	interviewed.	We	also	interviewed	Board	members	or	Governors	of	private	banks,	
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state	 banks	 and	 central	 banks,	 business	 leaders,	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 banking	 regulators	
(national	and	international),	police,	prosecutors,	judges	and	intelligence	officials.		
	
To	a	lesser	degree,	we	rely	on	more	than	4000	interviews	of	more	than	5000	individuals	(some	
interviews	 were	 with	 more	 than	 one	 informant)	 since	 2005	 from	 the	 entire	 Peacebuilding	
Compared	project	led	by	the	second	author.2	Peacebuilding	Compared	has	so	far	coded	39	armed	
conflicts.	We	have	used	these	data,	 for	example,	 to	understand	how	Ponzi	schemes	operate	 in	
Papua	New	Guinea,	how	Nugan	Hand	and	BCCI	operated	in	Burma,	how	Presidents	Mobutu	and	
Kabila	 transformed	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo	 (DRC)	 from	 the	 second	 most	
industrialized	and	sophisticated	economy	in	Africa	(after	South	Africa)	to	rock	bottom	in	GDP	per	
capita	and	in	the	United	Nations	(UN)	Human	Development	Index	list.	A	comparative	method	is	
ideal	for	widening	our	global	imagination	of	criminological	complexity.	We	also	rely	on	reading	
the	white‐collar	crime	literature	in	a	radically	globalized	way,	rather	than	in	the	standard	North	
Atlantic	way.		
	
Evolutionary	ecologies	of	banking	crime	
We	consider	briefly	the	first	11	entries	on	the	list	of	strategies	of	predation.	Then	we	consider	in	
more	detail	our	‘discovery’	of	Slovenia	and	Croatia’s	use	of	an	even	bolder	strategy.	
	
1.	Rob	a	bank	at	the	point	of	a	gun	
This	modality	of	bank	crime	is	familiar	to	readers	who	have	seen	the	film	Bonnie	and	Clyde,	or	
Northern	cinema	like	it.	Bonnie	and	Clyde	illustrates	that	it	is	hard	for	down‐and‐out	bank	robbers	
to	match	the	firepower	of	the	state.	Consequently,	robbing	a	bank	at	the	point	of	a	gun	is	no	longer	
a	significant	threat	to	developed	economies.		
	
In	civil	wars,	rural	microfinance	banks	are	always	looted	by	armed	groups;	always	and	totally.	
Even	when	a	bank	is	totally	looted,	we	have	interviewed	bankers	and	even	a	finance	minister	who	
were	asked	at	the	point	of	a	gun	to	write	a	check	from	a	bank	with	no	money	in	it.	So,	strategy	1	
retains	an	important	niche	in	the	contemporary	world	for	criminologists	who	widen	their	gaze	
beyond	North	Atlantic	states.	Even	in	the	North	Atlantic,	different	factions	of	the	Irish	Republican	
Army	have	robbed	banks	at	the	point	of	a	gun	in	the	UK.		
	
Armed	factions	in	Afghanistan	have	been	quite	accomplished	at	looting	American	banking	capital	
inside	their	country	and	shifting	it	to	the	United	Arab	Emirates,	as	have	ISIS/ISIL	(Islamic	State	of	
Iraq	 and	 the	 Levant)	 fighters	 in	 emptying	 the	 banks	 of	 Iraq’s	 oil‐rich	 second	 city,	 Mosul.	 US	
counter‐strategy	was	crude	in	its	simplicity	as	well:	bomb	Mosul’s	banks	to	set	fire	to	the	cash.	
	
2.	Rob	a	bank	at	the	point	of	a	pen	
American	cinematography	continued	to	explore	bank	crime	in	Catch	Me	If	You	Can.	The	film	is	
based	on	the	real	exploits	of	Frank	Abagnale,	who	ripped	off	several	hundred	banks	by	signing	
forged	checks	using	different	names,	stealing	over	US$2	million	during	the	late	1960s	(Abagnale	
and	Redding	2003:	12).	Abagnale’s	success	was	in	continuous	change	of	bank	fraud	strategies	for	
a	period	of	five	years,	because	every	strategy	would	work	for	a	limited	time.	His	frauds	included	
writing	 personal	 checks	 on	 his	 own	 overdrawn	 bank	 account,	 which	 worked	 until	 the	 bank	
demanded	payment.	Then	he	moved	on	to	opening	other	accounts	at	different	banks,	eventually	
creating	new	identities.	Over	time,	Abagnale	developed	a	number	of	methods	to	defraud	banks,	
including	printing	copies	of	payroll	checks,	depositing	them,	and	encouraging	banks	to	advance	
him	cash	based	on	his	account	balances.	One	of	Abagnale’s	favorite	cons	was	printing	his	account	
number	 on	 blank	 deposit	 slips	 and	 adding	 them	 to	 the	 stack	 of	 real	 blank	 slips	 in	 the	 bank	
(Hammerand	2012).	When	the	bank	clients	wrote	their	deposits	on	those	slips,	they	entered	his	
account	rather	than	the	accounts	of	the	legitimate	customers.	Hence,	already	half	a	century	ago,	
Abagnale	developed	strategies	that	went	beyond	simply	robbing	a	bank	at	the	point	of	a	pen.	
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White‐collar	crime	at	the	point	of	a	pen	is	doubly	anachronistic.	Check	usage	and,	generally,	bank	
transactions	involving	written	documents	have	become	obsolete.	Today	bank	crime	occurs	at	a	
keystroke	(strategy	6);	the	criminal	actor	might	no	longer	have	white‐collar	male	business	attire.	
For	a	time,	computerization	of	banking	made	keystroke	crimes	more	lucrative	than	crimes	at	the	
point	of	a	pen.	Examples	were	rounding	crimes	where	bank	employees	would	instruct	a	computer	
to	deposit	 large	 volumes	of	decimal	point	 rounding	errors	of	 a	 fraction	of	one	cent	 into	 their	
accounts.	As	computer	technologies	became	more	sophisticated,	however,	crimes	of	a	keystroke	
that	 involved	 changing	 a	 number	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 leave	 behind	 an	 indelible	 electronic	
signature	 than	 forgeries	with	 a	 pen.	 Audit	 software	 also	 grew	 in	 sophistication	with	 the	new	
information	technology.		
	
3.	Build	a	Ponzi	banking	structure	where	all	depositors	pass	on	a	higher	liability	to	another	
until	collapse	when	new	depositors	cannot	be	found		
A	Ponzi	scheme	fraudulently	promotes	belief	in	the	success	of	a	non‐existent	enterprise	by	paying	
quick	 returns	 to	 early	 investors	 from	 money	 invested	 by	 later	 investors.	 Such	 schemes	 rob	
primarily	those	later	investors,	rather	than	banks.	But,	once	a	massive	Ponzi	scheme	crashes,	it	
ultimately	results	 in	enormous	 financial	 losses	 for	banks	who	gave	 loans	 to	 the	Ponzi	scheme	
investors.	Bernie	Madoff	may	have	used	the	high	reputation	of	his	investment	firm	to	take	the	
Ponzi	scheme	to	a	new	high‐water	mark	by	stealing	$20	billion	in	investor	funds.	
	
4.	Use	your	power	over	the	CEO	of	a	bank	to	order	the	payment	of	a	large	loan	to	your	relative	
or	crony	
Current	President	Dodik	of	Republika	Srpska	faces	allegations	of	this	sort	in	relation	to	more	than	
one	Bosnian	bank	that	he	can	influence	as	President,	including	allegations	of	a	very	large	loan	to	
his	18‐year‐old	son	to	start	an	agricultural	business	(when	he	has	no	agricultural	experience	in	
comparison	with	the	country’s	countless	farmers	who	are	unable	to	secure	loans).	Loans	can	be	
interest‐free	or	at	ridiculously	low	interest	rates;	in	the	worst	cases	they	are	never	repaid.	One	of	
the	ways	President	Milosevic	bankrupted	Serbia	in	the	1990s	was	by	allowing	his	cronies	to	take	
very	large	loans	in	Serbia’s	hyperinflationary	currency,	instantly	exchanging	that	cash	for	hard	
currency.	A	month	later,	the	currency	had	halved	in	value	and	only	half	this	hard	currency	was	
then	required	to	pay	out	the	loan.	The	paradox	of	this	strategy	for	looting	an	economy	is	that	the	
coercion	of	banks	to	cooperate	with	 it	creates	the	very	hyperinflation	that	makes	the	strategy	
work.	
	
5.	Own	a	bank	
Charles	Keating	was	the	most	celebrated	of	hundreds	of	owners	of	Savings	and	Loan	institutions	
in	the	1980s	who	used	their	control	to	loot	financial	institutions	for	personal	gain,	walking	away	
rich	while	their	depositors	lost	their	deposits	(Black	2005;	Calavita,	Pontell	and	Tillman	1999).	
Savings	 and	 Loan	 predators	 in	 the	 1980s	 took	 advantage	 of	 deregulation	 of	 the	 industry	 for	
personal	enrichment.	Owning	a	bank,	however,	may	not	be	such	a	lucrative	form	of	predation	in	
comparison	with	robbing	a	state‐owned	central	or	commercial	bank.	State‐owned	commercial	
banks	have	taken	the	lead	in	the	world’s	bank	rankings	(China’s	Big	Four).	This	means	that	the	
biggest	bank	robberies	can	occur	in	state‐owned	banks	because	they	hold	most	money.		
	
6.	Rob	a	bank	at	the	point	of	a	keystroke	
Even	before	the	Information	Age,	robbing	banks	at	the	point	of	a	keystroke	was	possible.	No	pen	
was	needed	to	orchestrate	one	of	the	largest	bank	frauds	of	the	Industrial	Age—just	encrypted	
telegraphy.	In	the	outbreak	of	the	Spanish	Civil	War,	in	1936,	more	than	500	tons	of	the	Bank	of	
Spain’s	gold—with	a	value	at	that	time	of	more	than	$500	million—was	shipped	to	the	Soviet	
Union	to	keep	it	safe	(Bolloten	1991:	148).	After	getting	his	hands	on	the	gold,	Stalin	manipulated	
the	exchange	rates	and	sold	overpriced	and	obsolete	weapons	to	Spain,	whose	central	bank	never	
saw	 its	 gold	 again.	 The	 agreement	 on	 the	 gold	 shipment	was	 never	 documented	 because	 the	
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correspondence	mostly	relied	on	coded	telegraphy	between	Stalin	and	Spanish	Prime	Minister	
Caballero.	The	only	evidence	of	this	communication	was	a	telegram	from	Stalin	to	his	NKVD	spy	
Alexander	Orlov,	containing	the	following	order:		
	
…	arrange	with	the	head	of	the	Spanish	Government,	Caballero,	for	the	shipment	
of	the	gold	reserves	of	Spain	to	the	Soviet	Union	…	This	operation	must	be	carried	
out	with	the	utmost	secrecy	…	If	the	Spaniards	demand	from	you	a	receipt	for	the	
cargo,	refuse.	I	repeat,	refuse	to	sign	anything	and	say	that	a	formal	receipt	will	be	
issued	in	Moscow	by	the	State	Bank.	(Bolloten	1991:	147)	
	
Each	new	wave	of	banking	technology,	such	as	online	and	mobile	banking,	opens	new	doors	to	
cybercriminals	(Grabosky	2015).	This	has	superseded	direct	email	phishing	to	bank	customers.	
Remote	access	Trojans	regularly	attack	the	largest	of	banks.	In	2011	over	300,000	online	Citibank	
accounts	were	compromised	in	a	targeted	hack	of	the	organization’s	network	(Citibank	2011).	
	
7.	Loot	the	central	bank	by	abusing	political	power		
One	of	 the	 largest	bank	robberies	 in	history	 took	place	 in	March	2003	when	Saddam	Hussein	
pulled	out	approximately	US$1	billion	 from	the	Central	Bank	of	 Iraq,	 just	hours	before	 the	US	
began	bombing	Baghdad.	Saddam	sent	his	son	Qusay,	accompanied	by	his	personal	assistant,	to	
the	 central	 bank	with	 a	handwritten	order	 to	 load	US$900	million	 and	€100	million	 in	 three	
lorries	(Filkins	2003;	Taylor	2007).	US	troops	later	found	most	of	the	stolen	money	in	Saddam’s	
palace.	
	
Just	 before	 the	 war	 in	 Yugoslavia	 began	 in	 1991,	 Milosevic’s	 regime	 pulled	 out	 18.2	 billion	
Yugoslav	dinars	(US	$1.5	billion)	from	Yugoslavia’s	Belgrade‐based	central	bank	(Bilandzic	2001:	
88).	The	regime	invested	that	money	largely	in	the	military,	but	it	was	also	used	for	Milosevic’s	
personal	 and	 political	 purposes	 (Interview	 81602	 with	 Raif	 Dizdarevic,	 former	 president	 of	
Yugoslavia).	The	unique	moment	of	Yugoslav	political	crisis	that	weakened	constitutional	control	
mechanisms	allowed	Milosevic,	himself	a	former	banker,	to	rob	Yugoslavia’s	central	bank.	
	
The	strategy	of	a	President	like	DRC’s	Mobutu	appointing	a	central	bank	governor	who	will	print	
bank	notes	for	the	president	to	spend	on	castles	in	Europe	works	in	the	short	term.	In	the	long	
term,	 it	 is	 not	 sustainable	 because	 it	 creates	 hyperinflation	 for	 similar	 reasons	 to	 the	
hyperinflation	 induced	 by	 presidents	 like	Milosevic.	 Once	 the	 international	 community	 stops	
lending	 to	 a	 country,	 both	 legitimate	 and	 illegitimate	 economic	 opportunities	 decrease	 for	
everyone,	including	the	president	who	caused	the	problem.	President	Mobutu	put	off	this	fateful	
day	by	fraudulently	misrepresenting	the	national	accounts	to	the	International	Monetary	Fund	
and	calling	on	his	friends	in	the	CIA	to	discourage	investigation	of	this	fraud	(from	the	1970s	to	
the	1990s	he	was	the	CIA’s	anti‐communist	darling	of	Africa).	
	
8.	Mortgage	the	future	wealth	of	a	country	you	control	to	foreign	powers;	send	offshore	the	
proceeds	from	the	loans	for	mortgaging	that	future.	
After	a	president	like	DRC’s	Mobutu	has	lost	power	because	he	looted	foreign	aid	and	loans,	then	
looted	the	currency	by	printing	bank	notes,	what	does	the	next	president	do?	Confidence	in	his	
country	 as	 a	 recipient	 of	 aid	 or	 loans	was	 shot.	 His	 currency	was	worthless.	What	Mobutu’s	
successors	did	to	stay	rich	and	stay	in	power	was	to	promise	military	commanders	sovereignty	
over	a	section	of	the	country	and	the	enslavement	of	its	people,	or	a	sector	of	its	natural	resources,	
in	return	for	using	their	soldiers	to	keep	them	in	power.	This	deal	also	involved	giving	the	military	
commanders	 a	 personal	 share	 up‐front	 of	 the	 future	 resources	 that	 would	 be	 looted	 in	 this	
mortgage	of	sovereignty.	In	this	way,	generals	from	the	Rwandan	and	Ugandan	army	were	given	
control	of	regions	of	DRC	rich	with	diamond,	coltan	and	other	resources,	as	were	factions	of	the	
DRC’s	own	national	army	and	ethnic	militias.	As	the	armies	that	replaced	Mobutu	with	the	first	
President	Kabila	moved	across	the	country	conquering	new	territory,	Laurent	Kabila	paid	them	
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by	mortgaging	the	future	of	their	country	to	them	in	this	way.	His	son	Joseph	Kabila	later	used	the	
same	basic	strategy.	In	addition,	Joseph	Kabila	has	taken	huge	up‐front	payments	of	up	to	US$6	
billion	from	foreign	mining	interests,	particularly	from	China,	for	their	enjoyment	of	long‐term	
contractual	monopolies	over	specific	resources.		
	
9.	Create	a	bank	 that	 serves	 the	dirty	money	needs	 of	 the	 intelligence	 services	 of	major	
powers;	use	the	superpower	protection	to	become	the	bank	of	choice	for	the	world’s	leading	
corporate	and	organized	criminals.	Then	loot	that	bank.		
	
Australia’s	most	vivid	banking	scandal	was	the	collapse	of	the	Nugan	Hand	Bank	in	
1980.	Michael	Hand	was	a	former	US	Green	Beret,	CIA	operative,	gun	runner	and	
diversified	criminal	entrepreneur.	He	 formed	Nugan	Hand	with	Frank	Nugan	 in	
1973.	Nugan	was	out	of	his	depth.	Was	he	murdered	or	did	he	commit	suicide	when	
found	shot,	slumped	over	the	steering	wheel	of	his	car	with	the	gun	beside	him	in	
1980?	A	plausible	interpretation	of	the	shooting	is	‘the	Mafioso	code.	We	give	you	
one	option:	kill	yourself,	die	with	honour’.	Nugan	Hand	made	magnificent	profits	
because	it	was	a	dirty	money	banker	to	the	CIA,	other	intelligence	agencies	and	
some	 of	 the	 world’s	 biggest	 organized	 criminals.	 These	 profits	 made	 the	 bank	
attractive	to	many	of	the	most	reputable	Australian	business	investors.	(McKenzie‐
Murray	2015)	
	
As	soon	as	it	collapsed,	Nugan	Hand	was	replaced	in	this	criminal	niche	by	the	Abu	Dhabi‐founded	
BCCI.	With	both	Nugan	Hand	and	BCCI,	the	criminals	in	charge	would	plunder	the	accounts	of	
clients	after	they	were	assassinated	and	conduct	similar	insider	looting	of	the	criminalized	bank.	
BCCI	became	the	seventh	largest	bank	in	the	world	through	being	banker	and	money	launderer	
to	the	world’s	biggest	criminals.	Its	crime	had	tragic	effects,	such	as	wiping	out	the	social	security	
fund	of	the	nation	of	Gabon.	BCCI	engaged	in	massive	fraud	and	bribery	itself	and	moved	money	
for	 other	major	 international	 fraudsters;	 for	 the	 biggest	 drug	 empires	 including	 the	Medellin	
cartel;	 for	 the	world’s	 leading	 terrorist	 groups;	 for	Manuel	Noriega	 and	 Saddam	Hussein;	 for	
Peru’s	central	bank	to	hide	for	its	president	a	quarter	of	the	nation’s	hard	currency	from	foreign	
bank	creditors;	for	covert	nuclear	programs;	and	for	illegal	US	arms	sales	to	Iran.	By	1988,	the	
then	CIA	director’s	nickname	for	the	bank—the	‘Bank	of	Crooks	and	Criminals	International’—
had	wide	currency	(Adams	and	Franz	1992;	Passas	1996).		
	
According	to	Passas	(1993),	impunity	for	banking	fraud	was	partly	the	power	of	cultivating	and	
bribing	some	of	the	most	influential	political	figures	in	the	world.	BCCI	provided	free	travel	to	the	
Secretary‐General	of	the	UN	and	to	Jimmy	Carter,	and	more	extravagant	benefits	to	many	other	
prominent	international	political	figures.	But,	impunity	was	also	due	to	the	power	of	harbouring	
the	secrets	of	the	CIA,	British,	French	and	Swiss	intelligence	who	used	the	services	of	the	bank.	
Then	there	was	the	power	of	the	major	shareholders,	particularly	the	Sheik	of	Abu	Dhabi	and	the	
top	management	role	of	a	former	head	of	Saudi	intelligence.	Ultimately,	BCCI’s	most	persuasive	
power	 was	 the	 US	 government’s	 and	 intelligence	 agencies’	 fear	 of	 disrupting	 Western‐Arab	
relations	and	touching	the	White	House	through	opening	up	the	bank’s	role	in	the	Iran‐Contra	
affair	(Passas	1993).	
	
10.	Structure	derivatives	to	conceal	the	true	state	of	the	national	debt	of	an	entire	country;	
use	this	opportunity	to	corruptly	skim	wealth	as	you	drive	the	country	to	bankruptcy	
Under	strategy	7,	we	saw	how	DRC’s	President	Mobutu	deployed	his	political	capital	with	the	US	
to	misrepresent	his	national	accounts	to	the	IMF.	Well	before	the	Global	Financial	Crisis,	reckless	
Greek	politicians	from	2001	deployed	a	more	sophisticated	strategy	for	concealing	their	national	
debt.	They	hired	Goldman	Sachs	as	a	financial	engineer	of	derivatives	that	would	conceal	the	debt.	
The	 engineering	 team	 was	 led	 by	 Goldman’s	 current	 CEO,	 Lloyd	 Blankfein.	 Blankfein’s	 team	
helped	 Greece	 hide	 the	 true	 extent	 of	 its	 debt,	 almost	 doubling	 it	 in	 the	 process	 (Reich	
Aleksandar	Maršavelski,	John	Braithwaite:	The	Best	Way	to	Rob	a	Bank	
IJCJ&SD						131	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(1)	
2015).	Goldman	Sachs	arranged	a	secret	loan	of	€2.8	billion	for	Greece,	concealed	as	an	off‐the‐
books	 cross‐currency	 swap.	 Greece’s	 foreign‐currency	 debt	 was	 converted	 into	 a	 domestic‐
currency	obligation	using	a	fictitious	market	exchange	rate.	Strictly	speaking,	this	was	fraud	not	
against	a	bank,	but	organized	by	a	bank	to	defraud	the	taxpayers	of	a	foreign	state	who	were	then	
later	bailed	out	by	taxpayers	of	other	states.		
	
11.	Manipulate	derivatives:	for	example,	slice	and	dice	bad	loans	of	banks;	misrepresent	and	
sell	the	securitized	bad	loans	to	banks	and	investors	in	less	sophisticated	economies	
The	Libor	scandal	has	recently	seen	major	banks	like	Barclays	before	the	courts.	It	may	be	the	
largest	fraudulent	manipulation	of	derivatives	markets.	Long	before	the	Global	Financial	Crisis,	
authors	like	Partnoy	(1997,	2000,	2003)	and	even	one	of	these	authors	(Braithwaite	2008:	32‐
63)	 were	 wringing	 hands	 at	 international	 conferences	 about	 the	 acute	 dangers	 of	 the	 way	
derivatives	were	being	used	to	financially	engineer	economies	around	all	manner	of	regulatory	
constraints.	The	Goldman	Sachs’	Greek	 foreign	debt	scam	(strategy	10)	and	 the	sub‐prime	US	
mortgage	scams	(strategy	11)	are	examples	of	this	generic	strategy	of	predation.	With	the	sub‐
prime	scams,	banks	were	encouraged	to	maximize	the	number	of	 their	housing	 loans	without	
prudence.	Countless	bad	debts	were	sliced	and	diced	into	securities	that	banks	misrepresented	
and	 sold	 on	 to	 banks	 in	 other	 countries.	 US	 banks	 stopped	managing	 risks	 and	 shifted	 risks	
instead.	 The	 consequence	 was	 that	 more	 European	 banks	 to	 which	 these	 risks	 were	 shifted	
collapsed	in	the	Global	Financial	Crisis	than	banks	in	the	US	that	were	the	originators	of	the	bad	
housing	debts.	These	characteristics	of	strategies	10	and	11	explain	why	the	consequences	of	the	
Global	Financial	Crisis	were	so	much	deeper	in	Europe	than	in	the	US	even	though	the	predatory	
financial	engineering	primarily	responsible	for	it	was	launched	in	the	US.		
	
12.	Change	the	currency;	keep	the	new	and	sell	all	the	old	cash		
The	robbery	of	Yugoslavia’s	central	bank	(strategy	7)	resulted	in	ending	the	supply	of	Slovenian	
and	 Croatian	 central	 banks	 with	 dinars.	 The	 two	 republics	 responded	 with	 declarations	 of	
independence,	and	began	introducing	their	own	currencies.	Slovenia	did	so	in	October	1991.	All	
the	Yugoslav	dinars	collected	from	the	citizens	were	supposed	to	be	shredded,	but	four	lorries	
with	bags	of	dinar	banknotes	of	smaller	value	were	sent	to	Croatia	and	other	former	Yugoslav	
republics,	 and	 exchanged	 for	 several	 million	 Deutschmarks	 (Surc	 and	 Zgaga	 2013:	 69).	
Technically,	 the	 Slovenian	officials	 robbed	 the	Slovenian	central	bank	which	was	 supposed	 to	
destroy	the	dinars,	but	the	real	victims	were	the	central	banks	of	other	former	Yugoslav	republics,	
which	were	hit	by	an	enormous	dinar	inflation	on	their	financial	markets.		
	
The	 strategy	 was	 still	 not	 exhausted.	 Other	 predators	 could	 adopt	 it	 without	 doubting	 its	
efficiency,	because	 it	was	still	unknown	to	the	authorities	 in	 the	rest	of	Yugoslavia,	except	 for	
Croatia,	where	police	were	already	investigating	the	flood	of	dinars	from	Slovenia	(Surc	and	Zgaga	
2013:	64‐65).	But,	the	Croatian	police	reports	actually	inspired	the	leading	figures	of	the	Croatian	
Democratic	Union,	including	Croatia’s	President	Tudjman,	Finance	Minister	Martinovic	and	their	
cronies,	to	repeat	the	same	scenario.	This	is	how	a	senior	official	in	Croatia’s	central	bank	(HNB)	
described	the	events	that	followed:	
	
In	order	to	develop	a	plan	of	what	to	do	with	the	Yugoslav	dinars,	in	late	October	
1991,	 Minister	 Martinovic	 asked	 the	 governor	 of	 HNB	 to	 postpone	 currency	
exchange	for	two	months,	although	the	new	banknotes	have	already	been	printed.	
Minister	Martinovic	allowed	the	introduction	of	Croatian	dinars	in	December	1991	
and	by	January	1992	all	dinars	were	exchanged.	The	money	was	exchanged	in	state	
owned	commercial	banks	in	Croatia,	which	were	obliged	to	give	all	the	Yugoslav	
dinars	to	the	HNB.	However,	some	of	the	banks	failed	to	hand	in	all	the	exchanged	
money	…	the	[remaining]	Yugoslav	dinars	collected	by	the	HNB	were	burned	in	a	
wood	processing	factory	in	early	1992,	in	presence	of	the	governor	of	the	HNB	and	
European	Community	officials.	(Interview	021701)	
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Part	of	the	Yugoslav	dinars	had	been	sent	in	lorries	to	Bosnia	to	be	exchanged	for	Deutschmarks	
in	an	operation	supervised	by	 the	Croatian	Democratic	Union’s	 leadership	 (Pavic	2006).	They	
employed	cronies	who	soon	became	wealthy	businessmen.	Being	involved	in	that	operation	was	
not	even	considered	shameful	but	an	act	of	patriotism,	knowing	that	Milosevic	was	the	first	mover	
into	central	 bank	 robbery,	 and	 that	 the	money	was	needed	 to	purchase	weapons	 for	defense.	
Hrvoje	Petrac,	a	successful	businessman	of	 the	1990s	and	a	Croatian	mafia	boss,	admitted	his	
involvement	in	the	dinar	exchange:	
	
…	 the	 deceased	 Jozo	 Martinovic	 who	 was	 the	 Minister	 of	 Finance	 at	 the	 time,	
allowed	the	operation	and	we	began	establishing	channels	for	currency	exchange.	
Overnight	 lorries	 were	 heading	 towards	 Sandzak,	 Bosnia,	 Banja	 Luka	 and	
indirectly	to	Belgrade,	because	we	were	unable	to	make	payment	orders	since	the	
transaction	system	was	not	in	operation.	During	these	several	months	we	provided	
enough	money	 to	 Croatia	 to	 purchase	 weapons	 and	 save	 it	 from	 the	 financial	
disaster	that	Serbia	was	preparing.	(Dikic	1999:	36)	
	
In	reality,	patriotism	was	not	the	main	motive	behind	this	operation.	Stjepan	Mesic,	who	was	the	
last	President	of	Yugoslavia,	the	first	Prime	Minister	of	Croatia,	and	a	high‐ranking	member	of	the	
Croatian	Democratic	Union	at	the	time,	told	us	that	 ‘[t]he	state	had	the	 least	benefit.	The	new	
millionaires	had	most	benefit,	making	their	fortunes	for	the	first	time	from	currency	trading	and	
currency	 stealing’	 (Interview	 081672).	 In	 his	 1993	 interview,	 Ivica	 Todoric,	 the	 wealthiest	
businessman	in	the	region	now	facing	criminal	charges,	mentioned	how	he	‘managed	to	pull	out	
a	 lot	 of	 goods	 from	Vojvodina	 [Serbia’s	 northern	 province]	 by	 drowning	 the	 Yugoslav	 dinars	
there’,	and	that	he	began	acquiring	state	owned	companies	with	15	million	deutschmarks	in	cash	
(Mlinarevic	1993:	7).		
	
After	looking	into	the	HNB’s	archives,	we	discovered	that	the	claim	of	the	money	being	burned	in	
1992	was	not	true.	According	to	the	available	documentation,	the	old	dinars	remained	in	HNB’s	
vault	 for	 almost	5	years	before	 their	destruction.	One	of	 the	 former	Croatian	prime	ministers	
informed	us	that	large	portions	of	the	old	dinars	were	missing,	and	that	the	remaining	part	stayed	
in	HNB’s	vault	for	resolving	Yugoslavia’s	succession	(Interview	031702).	In	1996,	however,	the	
Croatian	Government	issued	an	order	to	the	HNB	to	destroy	the	Yugoslav	dinars,	and	they	were	
all	burned	by	1997	in	a	wood	processing	factory.	The	committee	in	charge	for	the	destruction	
included	 one	 member	 of	 the	 European	 Community	 Monitoring	 Mission,	 but	 the	 team	 that	
implemented	the	destruction	of	27.3	billion	dinars,	packed	in	11,309	sacks	and	weighting	321	
tons,	was	all	composed	of	HNB	officials.	There	was	no	record	of	how	much	money	was	printed	
before	the	exchange.	This	allowed	currency	manipulations	on	black	markets	across	the	Croatian	
border.	
	
The	greatest	victim	of	the	dinar	affair	was	Bosnia.	When	the	new	BiH	central	bank	governor	took	
office	in	1992,	he	said	he	found	no	foreign	currency	in	the	bank:	‘The	vault	was	empty.	There	was	
not	even	gold’	(Interview	081628).	A	number	of	individuals	in	Bosnia	also	enriched	themselves	
in	the	process,	particularly	those	linked	to	the	BiH	branch	of	the	Croatian	Democratic	Union.	The	
former	Deputy	Prime	Minister	of	BiH,	Zlatko	Lagumdzija,	said	that	‘they	did	it	for	high	national	
causes	but	a	lot	of	the	money	ended	up	in	their	pockets.	Many	of	them	made	their	first	million	out	
of	it	and	went	on	to	become	very	prominent	businessmen’	(Interview	081637).	A	former	Bosnian	
president	 told	us	 that	 ‘[s]everal	Bosnian	businessmen	 took	big	 loans	with	which	 they	bought	
lorries	full	of	dinars	at	discount	prices.	Then	they	used	those	dinars	to	immediately	repay	the	loan	
at	a	large	profit	.	.	.	That	is	how	they	started	on	the	road	to	becoming	tycoons’	(Interview	081639).	
Wartime	entrepreneurs	typically	chose	to	be	publicly	perceived	as	patriots	while	using	war	for	
rapid	enrichment.	For	them,	‘[p]atriotism	is	a	very	beautiful	thing	but	it	must	not	be	permitted	to	
interfere	with	business’	(Sutherland	1983:	190).		
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Discussion:	Anomie	reconsidered	
From	 a	 criminological	 perspective,	 illicit	 war	 profiteering	 is	 a	 war	 crime	 (Sutherland	 1983).	
Legally,	apart	from	pillaging,	war	profiteering	does	not	constitute	a	war	crime,	and	contemporary	
transitional	 justice	 mechanisms	 have	 completely	 neglected	 profiteering.	 Croatia	 is	 the	 first	
country	in	the	world	that	changed	its	Constitution	to	allow	prosecutions	of	war	profiteers	and	
transition	profiteers	after	the	statutes	of	limitations	expired	(Novoselec,	Roksandic	Vidlicka	and	
Maršavelski	2015).	Dozens	of	individuals	have	already	been	brought	to	trial,	but	outcomes	and	
the	difference	they	make	are	too	early	to	call.	
	
Banking	crime	is	evolutionary	in	our	analysis.	Secret	new	strategies	of	banking	predation	evolve.	
Exposure	of	 them	creates	legitimation	problems	for	states	as	was	vivid	with	the	problems	the	
Australian	state	confronted	when	the	activities	of	the	Nugan	Hand	bank	were	exposed.	Repeated	
crisis	 following	 disclosure,	 as	 we	 see	 with	 BCCI	 causing	 a	 crisis	 for	 John	 Major’s	 British	
government,	 can	 leave	 this	 strategy	 of	 banking	 predation	 decreasingly	 attractive	 for	 banking	
criminals.	Yet‐to‐be‐discovered	strategies	of	predation,	or	yet‐to‐be‐understood	ones,	are	likely	
to	be	the	most	lucrative.	Opportunities	reopen	for	all	previous	phases	of	innovation	in	banking	
predation,	 however,	 when	 monitoring	 and	 regulatory	 resources	 shift	 to	 new	 strategies	 of	
predation,	softening	old	targets.	This	is	the	evolutionary	ecological	theory	of	crime	that	makes	
sense	of	our	12	phases	of	innovation.		
	
This	 ecological	 theory	 of	 predation	 is	 layered,	 and	 indeed	 overlaid,	 with	 anomie	 theory	
(Durkheim	1952	[1897];	Merton	1949).	Anomie	theory	is	conventionally	deployed	in	criminology	
to	explain	why	disadvantaged	individuals	commit	unsophisticated	crimes	of	the	Bonnie	and	Clyde	
variety	(strategy	1).	In	the	Greek,	anomia	has	a	broader	meaning,	which	we	paradoxically	find	
more	 fertile	 for	 the	crimes	of	contemporary	capitalism.	 It	means	 literally	a	condition	of	being	
without	norms.	The	Greek	etymology	of	‘anomie’	is	from	‘a’	(without)	and	‘nomos’	(law	or	norms).	
‘Norms’	is	a	much	wider	concept	than	rules:	it	means	customary	expectations	of	behaviour	that	
coordinate	 interactions	 with	 others.	 Biblical	 anomia	 was	 lawlessness	 that	 encompassed	
disregard	 of	 God’s	written	 and	 living	word	 (Strong’s	 Greek	 Concordance	2016:	 458).	Anomia	
encompassed	a	breakdown	of	principles	as	well	as	rules	in	the	original	Greek	meaning.	Durkheim	
(1952	 [1897])	 generally	 cleaves	 closer	 to	 the	 original	 Greek	 conception	 than	 contemporary	
criminologists,	though	Durkheim	also	gives	anomie	a	range	of	more	specific	meanings	that	are	
used	inconsistently	between	different	works	(DiCristina	2016).	
	
Our	 banking	 data	 show	 why	 the	 originating	 Greek	 conception	 behoves	 us	 to	 consider	 more	
structurally	profound	conditions	of	anomie	than	we	see	in	Merton	(1949)	and	in	the	work	of	the	
most	influential	contemporary	criminological	theorists	such	as	Messner	and	Rosenfeld	(2012).	
War	is	the	most	simple	and	profound	of	these.	Total	war	is	a	condition	where	all	bets	are	off	as	to	
what	the	rules	of	 the	game	are	and	who	 is	 in	charge	to	enforce	 them.	We	have	seen	how	war	
creates	 circumstances	 of	 illegitimate	 opportunity	 that	 are	 unavailable	 in	 peace.	 It	 creates	
conditions	of	what	Shover	and	Hochstetler	(2005)	call	 lure,	 illegitimate	opportunity	combined	
with	ease	of	exploitation,	absence	of	oversight.	War	creates	new	rules	of	the	game	about	who	can	
get	away	with	looting	a	bank	and	how	they	can	do	it.	After	war,	anomie	often	takes	a	long	time	to	
subside	and	new	variants	of	banking	predation	persist	post‐war	and	proliferate.		
	
While	war	is	the	most	extreme	and	simple	source	of	anomie,	the	most	profound	and	complex	font	
of	anomie	is	capitalism.	Innovation	unsettles.	Polanyi	(1944)	described	‘creative	destruction’	as	
the	energizing	dynamic	of	capitalism,	and	Klein	(2007)	argued	that	‘disaster	capitalism’	has	risen	
to	 prominence	 because	 of	 so‐called	 ‘shock	 therapy’	 strategies.	 This	 includes	 the	 creative	
destruction	of	communism	that	we	saw	in	Yugoslavia	 in	this	analysis.	Obsolete	banking	crime	
strategies	become	less	profitable	and	are	taken	over	by	more	sophisticated	and	secret	strategies.	
Capitalism	 thus	 promotes	 the	 engineering	 of	 anomie.	 Derivatives	 have	 positive	 uses	 and	 are	
backed	by	legitimating	narratives	of	powerful	capitalists	and	institutions	such	as	central	banks.	
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But	 as	 Partnoy	 (1997,	 2000,	 2003)	 and	 Braithwaite	 (2008)	 showed,	 the	 primary	 purpose	 of	
derivatives	was	to	engineer	banks	and	other	firms	around	diverse	kinds	of	regulatory	constraints.	
If	tax	law	touches	income	but	not	capital	gain	in	a	particular	context,	the	derivative	engineers	that	
income	into	capital	for	that	context.	If	prudential	regulation	requires	a	bank	to	have	more	hard	
reserves	to	cover	its	debts,	derivatives	can	re‐engineer	soft,	speculative	assets	to	reappear	as	hard	
reserves.		
	
Anomie	is,	therefore,	about	even	more	profound	phenomena	than	poor	people	being	unable	to	
realize	‘the	American	Dream’	(Merton	1949;	Messner	and	Rosenfeld	2012).	It	is	about	variegated	
capitalism	(that	is,	capitalism	that	is	often	not	at	all	American	or	neoliberal).	This	can	engender	
anomie	 that	 allows	 the	 most	 disastrous	 forms	 of	 banking	 crime,	 national	 bankruptcy	 and	
hyperinflation.	This	 in	 turn	 can	 create	 conditions	 for	 the	kinds	of	wars	we	 saw	 in	Yugoslavia	
(Woodward	1995)	and	DRC.	Capitalism	conduces	to	deep	structures	of	anomie;	anomie	conduces	
to	crimes	of	 capitalism	that	destabilize	regimes	and	can	 lead	 to	war;	war	creates	 the	greatest	
extremes	 of	 anomie	 that	 enable	 extreme	 crimes	 of	 capitalism.	 In	 sum,	we	 cannot	 understand	
ecologies	of	crime	and	war	without	understanding	the	ecologies	of	extremely	anomic	forms	of	
capitalism,	and	vice	versa.	These	are	the	senses	in	which	etymological	understanding	of	anomia	
is	more	analytically	useful	than	anomie	américaine.		
	
Conclusion:	Beyond	North	Atlantic	criminology	
Of	course,	theories	like	Hirschi’s	(2002	[1969])	social	control	theory	or	Wilson	and	Herrnstein’s	
(1985)	 rational	 choice	 approach	 might	 also	 be	 applied	 to	 rational	 bank	 robbers	 who	 abuse	
wartime	as	a	state	of	broken	mechanisms	of	social	control,	which	allows	them	to	get	away	with	
it.	 Sutherland	 (1983)	provided	good	answers	on	why	 those	kinds	of	 theoretical	paths	are	not	
fruitful	 in	 terms	 of	 other	 baggage	 that	 is	 central	 to	 them.	 These	 are	 not	 criminals	with	 poor	
impulse	 control;	 they	 tend	 to	be	 long‐term	 strategizers	who	 can	dissemble	 and	manage	 their	
appearances	with	great	emotional	intelligence.	They	are	not	below	we	criminologists	in	impulse	
control,	 in	 the	 class	 structure,	 in	 IQ,	 in	 personality	 disorder,	 in	 self‐esteem,	 in	 the	 collective	
efficacy	they	surround	themselves	with,	or	in	the	hardness	of	the	targets	they	confront.	One	could	
go	on	and	on	with	irrelevant	concepts	from	the	criminological	canon.	
	
Contemporary	 criminology	 is	 afflicted	with	 a	 dominance	 of	 two	 genres	 of	 scholarship.	One	 is	
exemplified	 by	 Bonnie	 and	 Clyde	 criminology	 that	 celebrates	 exciting	 lives	 of	 comparatively	
humble	criminals.	The	work	of	great	early	criminologists	 like	Bonger	(1916)	who	struggled	to	
correct	 that	 bias,	 and	Engels	 (1844)	 for	 that	matter,	 never	 became	part	 of	 the	 criminological	
canon.	
	
Secondarily,	another	dominant	genre	is	Western	‘critical	criminology’.	Critical	criminology	does	
correct	 the	neglect	of	 the	 impact	on	crime	of	 the	character	of	contemporary	capitalism,	but	 is	
obsessed	with	neoliberalism,	seeing	neoliberalism	everywhere,	failing	to	see	the	full	ecological	
diversity	 of	 capitalism.	 For	 example,	 in	 societies	 like	 China	 or	 Bangladesh,	 authoritarian	
capitalism	 flourishes	because	 it	 complements	neoliberalism	and	 is	quite	different	 from	 it.	Tax	
haven	capitalism	is	another	quite	different	kind	of	authoritarian	capitalism	from	the	authoritarian	
semi‐Islamic	industrial	capitalism	that	so	marginalizes	workers’	rights	in	Bangladesh.	Tax	haven	
capitalism	 is	 much	 used	 by	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 our	 twelve	 ecologies	 of	 banking	 crime	 from	
neoliberal	and	authoritarian	states	alike.		
	
China	played	a	role	in	the	banking	crime	entries	on	our	list	that	were	exemplified	by	the	different	
Presidents	 of	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo,	 and	 Forbes	 (2016)	 places	 China’s	 Big	 Four	
among	the	five	largest	banks	in	the	world.	Essentially,	China	manifests	authoritarian	capitalism	
rather	 than	 neoliberal	 capitalism	 (Thornton	 and	 Thornton	 2012).	 Yet	within	 China	 there	 are	
highly	variegated	forms	of	capitalism,	with	securities	markets	in	Shanghai	and	Hong	Kong	that	
have	similarities	with	New	York,	other	regions	that	work	more	like	Silicon	Valley,	others	that	are	
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more	like	Detroit’s	old	industrial	capitalism	(but	without	trade	unions)	and	village	agricultural	
societies	 that	 remain	closer	 to	 feudal	economies	 than	 to	 communism,	 industrial	 capitalism	or	
post‐industrial	 capitalism.	This	 is	Peck’s	critique	 that	varieties	of	capitalism	(Hall	 and	Soskice	
2001)	 describes	 ‘twin	 peaks’	 capitalism:	 western	 liberal	 capitalism	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 a	
coordinated	(for	example,	Scandinavian,	German)	variety	of	capitalism	on	the	other	(Peck	and	
Theodore	2007;	Peck	and	Zhang	2013;	Zhang	and	Peck	2016).	So,	we	might	open	our	minds	to	
variegated	 capitalism	 as	 something	 that	 varies	 enormously	 between	 societies	 and	within	 the	
geography	and	across	the	industry	sectors	of	the	same	large,	complex	society.	Theoretically,	the	
argument	of	this	article	is	not	just	for	linking	anomie	and	ecological	theories	of	crime.	It	is	also	
for	linking	these	to	the	theory	of	variegated	capitalism.	
	
All	countries	experience	the	anomie	of	war	during	their	histories;	all	experience	extreme	business	
cycles	of	capitalism	and	the	anomic	devastation	this	engenders.	Economic	collapse	and	war	close	
legitimate	 opportunities;	 anomie	 widens	 spaces	 of	 illegitimate	 opportunity.	 New	 niches	 are	
thereby	 created	 in	 endlessly	 innovating	 ecologies	 of	 predation	 that	 criminologists	 never	
understand	because	 they	are	always	pondering	 the	 last	war	 (in	 this	article	 the	banking	crime	
innovations	of	the	last	major	European	war	in	Yugoslavia).	We	learn	that	the	important	thing	to	
understand	 is	 the	 uncertain	 evolutionary	 process	 of	 the	 ecology	 of	 predation.	We	 learn	 that	
anomia	is	more	analytically	useful	because	it	comprehends	more	variegated	forms	of	lure	than	
anomie	 américaine	 that	 only	 makes	 sense	 for	 a	 narrowed	 neoliberal	 vision	 of	 capitalisme	
américaine.		
	
	
	
Correspondence:	 John	 Braithwaite,	 Distinguished	 Professor,	 School	 of	 Regulation	 and	 Global	
Governance,	College	of	Asia	&	 the	Pacific,	Australian	National	University,	Canberra	ACT	0200,	
Australia.	Email:	john.braithwaite@anu.edu.au	
	
	
1		An	earlier	version	of	this	paper	was	published	on	the	SSRN	website	in	August	2017.	
2		Project	website	available	at	http://regnet.anu.edu.au/research/research‐projects/details/534/peacebuilding‐
compared‐project	(accessed	5	December	2017).	
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